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Abstract
Several kinds of qubit-string-based(QS-based) bit commitment protocols are
presented, and a definition of information-theoretic concealing is given. All
the protocols presented here are proved to be secure under this definition.
We suggest an attack algorithm to obtain the local unitary transformation
introduced in no-go theorem, which is used to attack the binding condition,
then study the security of our QS-based bit commitment protocols under this
attack via introducing a new concept ”physical security of protocol”. At last
we present a practical QS-based bit commitment scheme against channel loss
and error.
1. Introduction
Research on quantum cryptography may be traced back to about 40 years
ago. Soon after Wiesner’s work published [1], Bennett and Brassard proposed
two quantum cryptographical protocols in their original paper [2]: quantum
key distribution (QKD) and quantum coin tossing. Though QKD had been
proved unconditionally secure [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] and applied in practice,
the quantum bit commitment (QBC) developed from quantum coin tossing
has been proved impossible [12, 13]. A generally accepted QBC scheme was
presented by Brassard, Crepeau, Jozsa and Langlois in 1993 [10], but its
unconditional security was shown to be impossible in 1996 [11]. Later, the
idea in [11] was developed by Mayers [12] and Lo-Chau [13] independently
and resulted in no-go theorem of QBC. It is shown that any kind of interactive
protocol of QBC is also impossible [14].
Although facing such clearly negative results, some authors still keep on
exploring the unconditionally secure QBC which cannot be covered by the
no-go theorem, or proving that the no-go theorem does not hold in some
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case. For example, Kent constructed a weaken scheme called quantum bit
string commitment [15], and then the concept of cheat-sensitive quantum
bit commitment is presented by Hardy and Kent [17]. These results were
developed by Buhrman et al. [18]. Yuen believes that there generally exists
unconditionally secure QBC protocols [16], though his results have not been
generally accepted yet.
In this paper, we show that the security of qubit-string-based (QS-based)
bit commitment using the length of string as safe parameter is better than
classical bit commitment, and it is possible to use QS-based bit commitment
as a practical scheme. The paper is organized as follows: in Sec.2 some pre-
liminaries are given; in Sec.3 we give the concept of information-theoretically
concealing for quantum bit commitment; in Sec.4,5,6 three kinds of QS-
based bit commitment protocols are presented and proved to be information-
theoretically concealing; in Sec.7, four other kinds of QS-based protocols are
discussed; finally in Sec.8, we show how to construct practical QS-based
protocols against channel loss and error.
2. Preliminaries
We relate here the concepts of classical bit commitment and nth0 -order
correlation immune Boolean functions, and describe a concrete form of EPR-
attack suggested by the no-go theorem [13], assuming that readers are famil-
iar with the concepts of Boolean function and the content of no-go theorem
of QBC.
2.1. Bit commitment
A bit commitment protocol includes two phases. In the commit phase,
Alice determines a bit (b=0 or 1) and sends to Bob a piece of evidence. Later
in the open phase, Alice opens the value of b and some information of the
evidence, and Bob checks whether Alice lies or not. A secure bit commitment
needs two properties: binding and concealing. Binding means Alice cannot
unveil 1 − b without being detected after giving the evidence; concealing
means Bob cannot get the value of b before Alice unveils it. It can be proven
that no classical bit commitment can satisfy both statistically concealing and
statistically binding simultaneously.
After quantum cryptography being put forward, people desire to realize
unconditionally secure QBC with quantum physics. Unfortunately, the no-
go theorem of QBC [12, 13] says there cannot be unconditionally secure
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QBC protocol, only unconditionally concealing or binding protocols can be
constructed.
2.2. nth0 -Order Correlation Immune Boolean Functions
Definition 1. Let random binary variables x1, x2, . . . , xn be independent and
uniformly distributed. Then a Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn) : GF
n(2) →
GF (2) is called nth0 -order correlation immune Boolean function if for every
subset {i1, . . . , in0} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, random variable z = f(x1, . . . , xn) is
statistically independent of variable (xi1 , . . . , xin0 ).
2.3. EPR-attack given in no-go theorem
At the commitment phase of a QBC scheme, the committer Alice chooses
commitment value b towards the receiver Bob. For a cheating Alice, she can
do as follows[13]:
1. Alice prepares a state |0ˆ〉 without committing any values and sends the
register B to Bob,
|0ˆ〉 =
∑
i
αi|ei〉A ⊗ |ψ(0)i 〉B, (1)
where 〈ei|ej〉 = δij , but the normalized states |ψ(0)i 〉B conform a set of
nonorthogonal states.
2. At the open phase, if Alice decides to commit 0, she makes a measure-
ment on the register A and gets the value of i, then sends i to Bob,
and declares 0 as her commitment value.
3. if Alice decides to commit 1, she makes a local unitary operation UA
on the register A which satisfies:
〈1ˆ|(UA ⊗ I)|0ˆ〉 = F (TrA|0ˆ〉〈0ˆ|,TrA|1ˆ〉〈1ˆ|) = 1− δ, (2)
where
|1ˆ〉 =
∑
i
βi|ei〉A ⊗ |ψ(1)i 〉B. (3)
Because the state (UA⊗ I)|0ˆ〉 is almost the same as the state |1ˆ〉, she can
do as if she has sent the state|1ˆ〉: she makes a measurement on the register
A and gets the value of i, and then tells Bob that she has committed the
value 1 and sends i to Bob. It can be seen that this attack strategy will be
successful with probability 1− δ with a small δ.
3
3. Information-theoretic security
In classical cryptography, the information-theoretic security is suggested
by O. Goldrich [19] as follows:
Definition 2. A private key encryption is information-theoretically indis-
tinguishable if for every circuit family {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·),
all sufficiently large n’s, and every x, y in plaintext space:∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(y)) = 1]∣∣∣ < 1
p(n)
, (4)
where G is a key generation algorithm.
We suggest here a definition of information-theoretically concealing for
quantum bit commitment protocol as follows:
Definition 3. A quantum bit commitment protocol is information-theoretically
concealing if for every quantum circuit family {Cn}, every positive polynomial
p(·), all sufficiently large n’s, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}:∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(y)) = 1]∣∣∣ < 1
p(n)
, (5)
where the encryption algorithm E should be a quantum algorithm.
According to this definition, we can get the following theorem of conceal-
ing condition:
Theorem 1. Let the density operators of quantum state Bob receives be ρ0
and ρ1, a QBC protocol is said to be information-theoretically concealing if
for every positive polynomial p(·) and every sufficiently large n,
D(ρ0, ρ1) <
1
p(n)
. (6)
Proof. Define S0 as a set containing all the states Bob could receive when
Alice commits 0. For every quantum circuit family {Cn},
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(0)) = 1]
=
∑
ρi0∈S0
pi · Pr[Cn(ρi0 ⊗ σ) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(
∑
ρi0∈S0
piρ
i
0 ⊗ σ) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(ρ0 ⊗ σ) = 1], (7)
4
where σ is the density operator of service bits of Cn.
Similarly,
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(1)) = 1] = Pr[Cn(ρ1 ⊗ σ) = 1]. (8)
Any quantum circuit family Cn built for distinguishing two density opera-
tors corresponds to a set of positive operator-values measure (POVM) {Em}.
Define pm = Tr(Cn(ρ0 ⊗ σ)Em), qm = Tr(Cn(ρ1 ⊗ σ)Em) the probabilities of
measurement outcomes labeled by m. In this case, we have:∣∣∣Pr[Cn(ρ0 ⊗ σ) = 1]− Pr[Cn(ρ1 ⊗ σ) = 1]∣∣∣
≤ max
{Em}
1
2
∑
m
|Tr[Em(Cn(ρ0 ⊗ σ)− Cn(ρ1 ⊗ σ))]
= max
{Em}
D(pm, qm). (9)
The last formula is equal to
D(Cn(ρ0 ⊗ σ), Cn(ρ1 ⊗ σ)) ≤ D(ρ0 ⊗ σ, ρ1 ⊗ σ) = D(ρ0, ρ1) < 1
p(n)
. (10)
Hence, according to the Definition 3, the theorem follows. 
To those QS-based protocols described in this paper, the safe parameter
n is the length of qubit string used in protocols.
4. QS-based bit commitment based on coding of two non-orthogonal
states[23]
4.1. The scheme
Let |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 be two non-orthogonal states, F(·) is an nth0 -order cor-
relation immune Boolean function. The protocol is as follows:
Protocol 1.
1. Alice makes a commitment b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Alice chooses a(i) ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, here i = 1, 2, . . . , m, a(i) =
(a
(i)
1 , a
(i)
2 , . . . , a
(i)
n ) satisfies F (a(i)) = b.
3. Alice preparesm×n qubits in state |ψ
a
(1)
1
〉 · · · |ψ
a
(1)
n
〉 |ψ
a
(2)
1
〉 · · · |ψ
a
(2)
n
〉 · · · · · ·
|ψ
a
(m)
1
〉 · · · |ψ
a
(m)
n
〉, and sends it to Bob as a piece of evidence for her
commitment.
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4. Alice opens by declaring b and the values of a(i).
5. Bob checks states of qubits by corresponding projective measurements: if
a
(i)
j = 0, Bob measures the (n×j−n+i)th qubit with basis {|ψ0〉, |ψ0〉⊥};
else with basis {|ψ1〉, |ψ1〉⊥}. unless each results is matched, Bob has to
break off the scheme.
6. Bob checks commitment value b. If a(i) satisfies b = F (a(i)) for every
i, Bob accepts the commitment value. 
4.2. The concealing condition
When n0 = n− 1, nth0 -order correlation immune Boolean function is the
parity function
F (a(i)) = a
(i)
1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a(i)n . (11)
Suppose density operator ρ
(n)
b represents the state Bob receives when Alice
commits b. As assumed, Alice sends each |ψa(i)〉= |ψa(1)1 〉 · · · |ψa(1)n 〉 according
to a uniform probability distribution, then
ρ
(n)
b =
1
2n−1
∑
F (a(i))=b
|ψa(i)〉〈ψa(i) |. (12)
Lemma 2. The protocol 1 is information-theoretically concealing.
Proof. Let α be the angle between |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉.
The quantum states ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 satisfy [20, 22]:
ρ
(n)
0 − ρ(n)1 = 2×
[
0 sin(α
2
) cos(α
2
)
sin(α
2
) cos(α
2
) 0
]⊗n
, (13)
then we have
D(ρ
(n)
0 , ρ
(n)
1 ) =
1
2
Tr
∣∣∣ρ(n)0 − ρ(n)1 ∣∣∣ = (sinα)n. (14)
The parity function is usually used m times in a scheme. We denote the
density operator of these m × n qubits as ρ(n,m)0 and ρ(n,m)1 . By using the
triangle inequality of trace distance and |A ⊗ B| = |A| ⊗ |B|, we can show
that
D(ρ
(n,m)
0 , ρ
(n,m)
1 ) ≤ m× (sinα)n. (15)
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It can be seen that for every given m, every positive polynomial p(·) and
every sufficiently large n,
D(ρ
(n,m)
0 , ρ
(n,m)
1 ) <
1
p(n)
(16)
holds. According to Theorem 1, this lemma is proved. 
Our proof of inequality (16) is valid only if parity function is used. We
conjecture that if we use other nth0 -order correlation immune Boolean func-
tions to construct schemes, it may also satisfy inequality (16).
4.3. The Binding Condition
The Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem shows that while the bit commitment
protocol is concealing, it can not be binding. Here we first show a concept of
physical security of protocol, which means that the physical resource required
in the breaking of a cryptosystem is beyond that of human beings given by the
nature. Note that there is no protocol can achieve Shannon’s computation
security, the concept of physical security of protocol provides a way to reach
Shannon’s computation security.
In the Appendix A, we show a method to achieve the attack to the
binding condition. Under such idea the attack algorithm’s time complexity
is O(23n), besides this algorithm needs at least O(22n) size of memory space to
store the matrix. While n = 100 the entry number of matrix UA is 2
100×2100,
this number is greater than the number of atoms of the earth(approximately
1050). It means that human beings cannot get the matrix actually, the attack
strategy suggested in no-go theorem cannot be realized in this case forever,
and our scheme may be physically secure on the binding side, if there is no
efficient algorithm can help to find the local unitary transformation.
It has been proved that the security of classical bit commitment is at
most statistically secure on one hand and computationally secure on the other
hand, then the QS-based bit commitment with information-theoretically con-
cealing and physically binding is a meaningful improvement if there is no ef-
ficient algorithm can help to find the local unitary transformation. However,
whether the efficient algorithm exists is still an open problem.
Note that the parameter m increases the trace distance between the den-
sity operators of the evidence for commit 0 and 1, it is used to resist another
attack scheme toward binding condition. Every a(i) satisfies F (a(i)) = 0 can
become satisfying F (a(i)) = 1 with one bit of change, and if Bob measures
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|ψj〉 with basis {|ψ(1−j)〉, |ψ(1−j)〉⊥}, it takes probability 12 that he accepts
the result, therefore without m Alice can cheat with a fifty-fifty chance of
success, else she can cheat successfully only with a little probability (1
2
)m.
That is the reason why we add the parameter m.
5. QS-based bit commitment based on conjugate coding[23]
5.1. The scheme
Let |0〉0 = |0〉, |1〉0 = |1〉, |0〉1 = |+〉, |1〉1 = |−〉, F(·) is an nth0 -order
correlation immune Boolean function. The protocol is as follows:
Protocol 2.
1. Alice makes a commitment b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Alice chooses a(i) ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, here i = 1, 2, . . . , m, a(i) =
(a
(i)
1 , a
(i)
2 , . . . , a
(i)
n ) satisfies F (a(i)) = b; and chooses b(i) ∈ {0, 1}n ran-
domly, here i = 1, 2, . . . , m, b(i) = (b
(i)
1 , b
(i)
2 , . . . , b
(i)
n ).
3. Alice preparesm×n qubits in state |a(1)1 〉b(1)1 · · · |a
(1)
n 〉b(1)n |a
(2)
1 〉b(2)1 · · · |a
(2)
n 〉b(2)n
· · · · · · |a(m)1 〉b(m)1 · · · |a
(m)
n 〉b(m)n and sends to Bob as a piece of evidence for
her commitment.
4. Alice opens by declaring b and the values of a(i) and b(i).
5. Bob checks states of qubits by corresponding projective measurements:
if b
(i)
j = 0, Bob measures with basis {|0〉, |1〉}, else with basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
6. Bob checks value b. If a(i) satisfies b = F (a(i)) for every i, Bob accepts
the value. 
5.2. The Concealing Condition
Consider F (·) is a parity function given in Eq.(11). Define σ(n)b the den-
sity operator of the state Bob receives when Alice commits b. Alice sends
|a(i)〉b(i) = |a(i)1 〉b(i)1 · · · |a
(i)
n 〉b(i)n , here a(i) satisfies F (a(i)) = b. For a uniform
probability distribution we have
σ
(n)
b =
1
22n−1
∑
b(i)
∑
F (a(i))=b
|a(i)〉b(i)〈a(i)|. (17)
Now we define two trace-preserving quantum operations E1 and E2.
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Suppose U⊗npi
4
is the operation element for E1, and {Ei} is a set of operation
elements for E2, here
Ei = H
i =
1
2n
H i1 ⊗ · · · ⊗H in, (18)
for i ∈ {0, 1}n. Upi
4
is a rotation operator, H0 is the unit operator, and H1 is
the Hadamard operator.
Notice that
HjU⊗npi
4
|0〉i = |i〉i⊕j¯, (19)
here i, j ∈ {0, 1}n, and while α = pi
4
we have
ρ
(n)
b =
1
2n−1
∑
F (a(i))=b
|0〉a(i)〈0|. (20)
Then we can get
E2 ◦ E1(ρ(n)b ) = E2
(
(Upi
4
)⊗nρ
(n)
b ((Upi4 )
⊗n)†
)
=
2n∑
j=1
∑
F (a(i))=b
1
22n−1
Hj(Upi
4
)⊗n|0〉a(i)〈0|((Upi4 )⊗n)†(Hj)†
=
1
22n−1
2n∑
j=1
∑
F (a(i))=b
|a(i)〉a(i)⊕j¯〈a(i)|, (21)
Let b(i) = a(i) ⊕ j¯, so
E2 ◦ E1(ρ(n)b ) = σ(n)b . (22)
Trace-preserving quantum operations are contractive, thus
D(σ
(n)
0 , σ
(n)
1 ) = D
(
E2 ◦ E1(ρ(n)0 ), E2 ◦ E1(ρ(n)1 )
)
≤ D(ρ(n)0 , ρ(n)1 ), (23)
according to Eq. (14), we have
D(σ
(n)
0 , σ
(n)
1 ) ≤ (sin
pi
4
)n (24)
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Lemma 3. The protocol 2 is information-theoretically concealing.
Proof. As the n-variable parity function is reused m times in our scheme,
the two density operators of Bob’s m× n qubits states are σ(n,m)0 and σ(n,m)1 .
By using the triangle inequality of trace distance and |A ⊗ B| = |A| ⊗ |B|,
We can show that
D(σ
(n,m)
0 , σ
(n,m)
1 ) ≤ m× (sin
pi
4
)n. (25)
It can be seen that for every given m, every positive polynomial p(·) and
every sufficiently large n,
D(σ
(n,m)
0 , σ
(n,m)
1 ) <
1
p(n)
(26)
holds. Hence the lemma follows. 
We conjecture that if we use other nth0 -order correlation immune Boolean
functions instead of parity function to construct the scheme, it may satisfy
the same inequality (26).
5.3. The Binding Condition
It can be seen that the algorithm to solve UA in this case is also with
O(23n) time complexity and at least O(22n) space complexity, then the bind-
ing condition of the protocol 2 is the same as the protocol 1.
6. QS-based bit commitment with referential bits
6.1. The scheme
Protocol 3.
1. Alice makes a commitment b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Alice chooses a(i), b(i) and c(i) ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, here i = 1, 2 · · · , m,
a(i) satisfies F (a(i)) = b.
3. Alice preparesm×2n qubits in state |a(1)〉b(1)|c(1)〉b(1) · · · |a(m)〉b(m)|c(m)〉b(m),
and sends to Bob with the values of c(i) published as a piece of evidence
for her commitment.
4. Alice opens by declaring b and the values of a(i) and b(i).
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5. Bob checks states of qubits by corresponding projective measurements
based on b(i) as the same as that of the protocol 2. Here he verifies
two sets of data: first, the c(i) published before should accord with the
measurement values; second, a(i) should satisfies b = F (a(i)) for every
i. If so, Bob accepts the commitment. 
6.2. The Concealing Condition
Also consider F (·) is a parity function given in Eq. (11). For a uniform
probability distribution, while the the c(i) is published, the density operator
for every i is
τ
(n)
b (c
(i)) =
1
22n−1
∑
b(i)
∑
F (a(i))=b
(|a(i)〉b(i)〈a(i)| ⊗ |c(i)〉b(i)〈c(i)|) , (27)
then the trace distance between τ
(n)
0 (c
(i)) and τ
(n)
1 (c
(i)) is
D(τ
(n)
0 (c
(i)), τ
(n)
1 (c
(i)))
=
1
22n
Tr
∣∣∣∣∣
n⊗
j=1
(
|0〉0〈0| ⊗ |c(i)j 〉0〈c(i)j | − |1〉0〈1| ⊗ |c(i)j 〉0〈c(i)j |+
+|0〉1〈0| ⊗ |c(i)j 〉1〈c(i)j | − |1〉1〈1| ⊗ |c(i)j 〉1〈c(i)j |
)∣∣∣ . (28)
Let
ϑ(i) = |0〉0〈0| ⊗ |i〉0〈i| − |1〉0〈1| ⊗ |i〉0〈i|+
+|0〉1〈0| ⊗ |i〉1〈i| − |1〉1〈1| ⊗ |i〉1〈i|, (29)
then we can rewrite the trace distance as
D(τ
(n)
0 (c
(i)), τ
(n)
1 (c
(i))) =
1
2n
Tr
∣∣∣∣∣
n⊗
j=1
ϑ(c
(i)
j )
∣∣∣∣∣ = 122n
n∏
j=1
Tr
∣∣∣ϑ(c(i)j )∣∣∣ . (30)
Remark 1. This direct product decomposition can be also used to solve the
trace distance D(ρ
(n)
0 , ρ
(n)
1 ) and D(σ
(n)
0 , σ
(n)
1 ) of the first two protocols. We
give that:
ρ
(n)
0 − ρ(n)1 =
1
2n−1
(|ψ0〉〈ψ0| − |ψ1〉〈ψ1|)⊗n ; (31)
σ
(n)
0 − σ(n)1 =
1
22n−1
(|0〉0〈0| − |1〉0〈1|+ |0〉1〈0| − |1〉1〈1|)⊗n . (32)
In this way the trace distances can result in exact values. 
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The matrix expressions of ϑ(c
(i)
j ) are shown as:
ϑ(0) =

1 0 1/2 1/2
0 0 1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 −1 0
1/2 1/2 0 0
 , (33)
ϑ(1) =

0 0 1/2 −1/2
0 1 −1/2 1/2
1/2 −1/2 0 0
−1/2 1/2 0 −1
 . (34)
They have the same eigenpolynomial as:
λ4 − 2λ2 + 1
4
, (35)
then we can have:
Tr |ϑ(0)| = Tr |ϑ(1)| = 2
√
3, (36)
so we get the value of the trace distance:
D(τ
(n)
0 (c
(i)), τ
(n)
1 (c
(i))) = (
√
3
2
)n, (37)
it holds for every i and c(i).
As the density operator for Bob while Alice commits b is shown as:
τ
(n,m)
b =
m⊗
i=1
τ
(n)
b (c
(i)). (38)
The trace distance between τ
(n,m)
0 and τ
(n,m)
1 is easily given out:
D(τ
(n,m)
0 , τ
(n,m)
1 ) ≤ m× (
√
3
2
)n, (39)
which means
D(τ
(n,m)
0 , τ
(n,m)
1 ) ≤
1
p(n)
(40)
can be held for every given m, every positive polynomial p(·) and every
sufficiently large n. Based on the Theorem 1, we know that this protocol is
information-theoretically concealing.
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6.3. The Binding Condition
It is the same as the above protocols.
7. Other protocols
Besides three protocols described above, we can also construct other QS-
based bit commitment protocols. There are four examples.
7.1. Scheme using both variable states and function value states
Protocol 4.
1. Alice chooses a commitment value b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Alice chooses x ∈ {0, 1}n randomly.
3. Alice prepares states |0〉x|0〉y, y = fb(x), then Alice sends the state to
Bob as a piece of evidence for her commitment. Functions f0(·), f1(·)
are known by both of them.
4. Alice opens by declaring b and the values of x, Bob checks the received
states of qubits.
5. Bob accepts the commitment if y is equal to fb(x). 
If we use only function value state |0〉y to commit, Alice can easily cheat
via finding a collision. Then we use both variable states and function value
states to commit. If Alice plans to cheat, she needs to prepare the state in
Bob’s hand remotely. According to the no-go theorem, she can prepare an
entangled state ∑
x
(|x〉|y〉)A ⊗ (|0〉x|0〉y)B . (41)
The concealing condition of this protocol is not easy to satisfy. We must
guarantee that there is no simple correlation between variable bit and func-
tion value bit. It can be seen that permutation cannot be used in this pro-
tocol.
7.2. Scheme using basis string
In the protocol 2, we use four states to encode the evidence state without
opening the basis of qubits. In fact, we can also encode the basis string of
qubits while opening the string of qubits itself. Here we present a protocol
follows this idea.
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Protocol 5.
1. Alice chooses a commitment value b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Alice chooses a(i), b(i) ∈ {0, 1}n, i = 1, 2, . . . , m randomly, b(i)) satisfy
F (b(i)) = b.
3. Alice prepares m×n qubits in state |a(1)〉b(1) · · · |a(m)〉b(m) and sends them
to Bob as a piece of evidence for her commitment.
4. Alice sends the values of a(i) within commit phase.
5. In open phase, Alice unveils the values of b and b(i).
6. Bob checks each qubit via projective measurements as above.
7. Bob accepts the commitment value if b(i) satisfies b = F (b(i)) for every
i. 
It is worth to mention that we can get a
(i)
j from the qubit |a(i)j 〉b(i)j and b
(i)
j ,
but we cannot get the value of b
(i)
j from the qubit and a
(i)
j with probability 1.
Based on this property Alice can open a(i) before open phase, and the binding
condition is still guaranteed with the aid of correlation immune Boolean
function.
Note that if a
(i)
j = 0 for every i, j, this protocol becomes the same as the
protocol 1.
7.3. Scheme using relative phase
Besides using basis, we can also use a relative phase to commit.
Protocol 6.
1. Alice chooses a commitment value b ∈ {0, 1}, and chooses randomly
x, e ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying e 6= (0, 0, · · · , 0).
2. Alice prepares state |x〉+ (−1)b|x⊕ e〉 and sends the state to Bob.
3. Alice opens the values of e and b.
4. Bob chooses randomly one nonzero bit of e, and uses the corresponding
qubit as control qubit to do CNOT operation to qubits corresponding to
other nonzero bits of e. After these Bob checks state of the control qubit
by measuring it with basis {|+〉, |−〉}. He accepts the commitment, if
the result is b. 
14
Define
ρ
(n)
b =
1
2n(2n − 1)
∑
x
∑
e 6=0
(|x〉+ (−1)b|x⊕ e〉) (〈x|+ (−1)b〈x⊕ e|) . (42)
It can be proved that D(ρ
(n)
0 , ρ
(n)
1 ) <
1
p(n)
. Therefore, Alice can prepare the
following state if she wants to attack:∑
x,e
1
22n
|x, e〉A ⊗ (|x〉+ |x⊕ e〉)B. (43)
7.4. An interactive scheme
Let F1, F2 · · ·Fk be k sets of Boolean functions, the domain of the function
in Fi is {0, 1}n1+n2+···+ni.
Protocol 7.
1. Bob chooses randomly f1j ∈ F1 and sends it to Alice.
2. Alice chooses a commitment value b ∈ {0, 1} and chooses randomly
a(1), b(1) ∈ {0, 1}n1 satisfying f1j(a(1)) = b. Alice sends |a(1)〉b(1) to Bob.
3. Bob chooses randomly fij ∈ Fi and sends it to Alice.
4. Alice chooses randomly a(i), b(i) ∈ {0, 1}ni satisfy fij(a(1), a(2), · · · , a(i)) =
b, and sends |a(i)〉b(i) to Bob.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 with i = 2, · · · , i0, here i0 is chosen by Bob for
each execution of the protocols.
6. Alice opens b and all the states she has sent.
7. Bob checks the states.
8. Bob verifies that the output of every function he chose is b, and accepts
the commitment. 
In this protocol, if Alice wants to attack with the attack of the no-go
theorem, she has to take into account all possible replies of Bob before the
execution of the protocol, and prepares a state as follows:
∑
j1,b(1)
∑
f1j1 (a
(1))=0
|a(1)〉b(1) ⊗ ∑
j2,b(2)
∑
f2j2 (a
(1),a(2))=0
(|a(2)〉b(2) ⊗ · · · · · ·)
 . (44)
In other protocols, Alice can prepare the state for each i = 1, 2, · · · , m
separately, but in this protocol, it is entangled for i = 1, 2, · · · , m. It seems
more complex than that of other protocols, but can be prepared efficiently
still.
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8. Practical scheme against channel loss and error
The protocols described above will be much useful if we can transform
them into practical ones. Here we present a way to realize this goal by using
error correcting code (ECC).
Channel loss
One may think that the protocols proposed are already secure against
channel loss, this opinion is based on such a consideration: Alice does not
know which qubits are lost, then she cannot cheat via a different opening of
these qubits successfully all the time. Bob can simply verify the consistency
of his measurement results and the values Alice opened to decide whether to
accept the commitment value.
In fact, a problem exists in every QS-based protocol executed over a lossy
channel is that Alice can always attack with a low loss channel: she keeps
several qubits in hand and sends the rest with a low loss channel, then she
can cheat via opening these qubits with different values and Bob cannot de-
tect this attack at all.
Channel error
In this situation the QS-based protocol without additional design cannot
be operated properly, since the inconsistency between the opened informa-
tion and the measurement results can be owed to either channel errors or
Alice’s cheating.
The solution
Generally speaking, channel loss can be regarded as a kind of channel
error, because a disappeared qubit can always be regarded as an error qubit
in state |0〉. Therefore, if a QS-based bit commitment protocol is one against
channel error, we treat it as one against channel loss.
Next we construct a protocol based on ECC. In order to keep concealing,
we should build the ECC C as follows:
Suppose ξ × η matrix G and η × (η − ξ) matrix H are generator matrix
and check matrix of an ECC C1 with error correcting ability t, and there is
one row of H whose every entry is ”1”. It can be shown that any 2t rows of
this matrix are linear independent.
Let (η − 1) × (η − ξ) matrix H ′ has every row of H except that with
all ”1” entries. Define C by a generator matrix G˜(η−ξ)×(η−1) = (H
′)T , here
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requiring η − ξ is a factor of n. Then the check matrix of C is H˜(η−1)×(ξ−1),
and the n-qubit string is encoded into ζ-qubit string, here ζ = n
η−ξ
× (ξ− 1).
Generally speaking, it is difficult to get the optimal check matrix from a
generator matrix since this problem is related with the NP-complete problem
of finding the decode algorithm of a general linear ECC. However, we can
get the H˜ efficiently for given parameters η, ξ.
The above method leads to that the values of any 2t − 1 bits of each
codeword of C are independent statistically from the commitment value. As
a result, the probability of Bob’s getting the parity bit with an (η− 1)-qubit
string is less than
p(1)max =
η−1∑
i=2t
C iη−1p
i
s(1− ps)η−1−i, (45)
where ps denotes the probability of Bob getting one qubit’s value correctly,
which is related to the probability of distinguishing two nonorthogonal states
and of channel error rate. Then the probability of Bob’s getting the commit-
ment value with an ζ-qubit string is less than
pmax = (p
(1)
max)
n
η−ξ . (46)
As the number of ζ-qubit-strings involved in a protocol is m, the proba-
bility of Bob’s getting the commitment value is less than
Pmax = 1− (1− pmax)m. (47)
Assume the probability of channel error is pce, for any QS-based protocol
with nth evidences, the worst situation is that Alice has a super channel with
no channel error and then she can open with some values changed which are
chosen by her. If the changes Bob found are less than n×pce, Alice can cheat
successfully. However we show that the encoding with suitable ECC C can
help Bob resist Alice’s attack and benefits the binding condition.
Let the error correcting ability of C is t′, it satisfies
t′ > (ξ − 1)× pce. (48)
Assume each change of value by Alice should be found out by Bob with
probability pcv(it should be
1
2
in most cases), then we just need
(t′ + 1)× n
η − ξ × pcv > n× pce. (49)
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This means if the expanded protocol with ECC satisfies
t′ > (η − ξ)× pce
pcv
− 1, (50)
every time Alice cheat with value changes, the number of error Bob found
will be more than it should be. Therefore the protocol can resist the super
channel attack by Alice.
However, this method leads to redundant information, which is disad-
vantageous to the concealing condition. We need the protocol satisfies the
Theorem 1.
Take the protocol 2 for an example. Assume m = 1, then the extended
protocol is shown as follows:
Protocol 8.
1. Alice makes a commitment b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Alice chooses a = (a1, a2 . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}n randomly. Then she uses
ECC C to code a and gets c1 = (c11, · · · , c1ξ−1), · · · , c
n
η−ξ = (c
n
η−ξ
1 , · · · , c
n
η−ξ
ξ−1 ).
3. Alice chooses b11, · · · , b
n
η−ξ
ξ−1 ∈ {0, 1} randomly, prepares ζ qubits in state
|c11〉b11 · · · |c
n
η−ξ
ξ−1〉
b
n
η−ξ
ξ−1
and sends to Bob as a piece of evidence for her com-
mitment.
4. Alice opens by declaring b and the values of a, cji and b
j
i .
5. Bob checks states of qubits by corresponding projective measurements:
if bji = 0, Bob measures with basis {|0〉, |1〉}, else with basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
Bob decode the result of measurement with C, the error probability
should less than pce and the message should be a.
6. Bob checks value b = F (a). 
Assume ςb is the density operator of quantum state Bob receives before
open phase while Alice commits b, it should contain the channel error. Let
the decoding process of C be C ′, so we get
ςb =
∑
F (C′(c1),···,C′(c
n
η−ξ ))=b
 nη−ξ⊗
j=1
ξ−1⊗
i=1
|cji 〉bj
i
〈cji |
 (51)
they should satisfy that
D(ς0, ς1) <
1
p(n)
. (52)
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9. Discussion
Our analysis of security above is for the situation that only one of Alice
and Bob is dishonest.
It can be seen that the QS-based QBC protocols have a common weak-
ness: the security of binding would not be guaranteed in a practical case
with channel loss or error. We solve this problem for the first time via trans-
forming QS-based protocols into ones with error correction coding. Both
bounded channel loss and error can be solved in this way, since we can take
channel loss as a special channel error and operate against it with error-
correction-code(ECC). Only the conditions for the QBC protocols based on
parity function have been given explicitly. How to transform general QBC
protocols into practical ones is still worth considering. Furthermore, the
ECC-based method is proved secure against individual attack only, the se-
curity against more general attacks is still an open problem.
Another problem in practice is the lack of single photon source. It can be
seen that the weak coherent pulse source cannot guarantee the two necessary
conditions at the same time: 1. Alice sends almost every qubit via emitting
single photon; 2. Bob receives almost every qubit. It can be seen that the
weak coherent pulse source is not suitable for our protocol. We need a single
photon source to accomplish the practical protocol in some laboratories.
10. Conclusion
We suggest a definition of information-theoretical concealing for quan-
tum bit commitment, then propose three kinds of QS-based bit commitment
protocols and prove that they are information-theoretically concealing. The
binding of them is considered under a new concept ”physical security of pro-
tocol”.
We have also suggested other four QS-based protocols without proof of
security. They will give some hints to help us get closer to the goal of
unconditionally secure QBC protocol.
Finally, we give a method to transform QS-based protocols into practical
ones with ECC.
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Appendix A. The attack to the binding condition
From Eq.(14) we have
F (ρ
(n)
0 , ρ
(n)
1 ) ≥ 1− (sinα)n. (A.1)
As shown in Sec.2.3, this result means Alice can use a local unitary transfor-
mation to perform a successful cheat. Here we show a method to solve out
UA of QS-based protocols.
For a cheating Alice, the states she prepared were shown as Eqs.(1) and
(3) in Sec.2.3. Now Alice needs to get the state |ν〉 whose reduced density
operator is the same as that of |0ˆ〉, and satisfies 〈1ˆ|ν〉 = F (ρ(n)0 , ρ(n)1 ). After
that she must find out the local unitary transformation UA to transform |0ˆ〉
into |ν〉.
In order to achieve these goals, Alice should do as follows:
1. The Schmidt decomposition of |0ˆ〉 and |1ˆ〉.
There exists an orthogonal basis set {|0〉, |1〉}⊗n for subsystems A and
B, thus |0ˆ〉 can be written as
|0ˆ〉 =
∑
i,j
θij |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B, (A.2)
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where i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1}, and
θij =
∑
k
αk B〈j|ϕ(0)j 〉B
if w(i), w(j) is even, here w(·) means Hamming weight; else
θij = 0.
Let Θ be a matrix with entries θij . According to the singular value
decomposition, we have Θ = UDV , here D is a diagonal matrix with
positive elements, and U and V are unitary matrices. Thus
|0ˆ〉 =
∑
i,j,k
uikdkkvkj|i〉A ⊗ |j〉B. (A.3)
Define |xk〉A =
∑
i uik|i〉A, |yk〉B =
∑
j vkj |j〉B, and λk = dkk, we can
see that
|0ˆ〉 =
∑
k
λk|xk〉A ⊗ |yk〉B. (A.4)
It can be seen that {|xk〉A}, {|yk〉B} form two orthogonal basis sets.
Similarly, Alice gets
|1ˆ〉 =
∑
k
λ′k|x′k〉A ⊗ |y′k〉B. (A.5)
2. The polar decomposition of
√
ρB1
√
ρB0 .
ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are defined with Eq. (12), the related polar decomposition
is √
ρB1
√
ρB0 =
∣∣∣√ρB1√ρB0 ∣∣∣T. (A.6)
There exists an orthogonal basis set with which ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are in block-
diagonal form[20] and the blocks have a general expression, so that we
can give the entries of matrix T based on this orthogonal basis.
3. Solving UA.
Based on the proof of Uhlmann’s theorem given by Jozsa [24, 25], we
have
|ν〉 =
(
I ⊗
√
ρB0 T
†
)∑
i
|x′i〉A ⊗ |y′i〉B. (A.7)
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It can be seen that there exists a local unitary transformation of Alice,
or UA, transforming |0ˆ〉 into |ν〉.
Note that ρB0 =
∑
i |λi|2|yi〉BB〈yi|, it gives
|ν〉 =
(
I ⊗
√
ρB0 T
†
)∑
i
|x′i〉A ⊗ |y′i〉B
=
∑
i,j
|x′i〉A ⊗ λj |yj〉BB〈yj|T †|y′i〉B
=
∑
j
λj
(∑
i
B〈yj|T †|y′i〉B|x′i〉A
)
⊗ |yj〉B. (A.8)
It can be seen that
UA|xi〉 =
∑
i
B〈yj|T †|y′i〉B|x′i〉A. (A.9)
Then Alice can get all elements of UA from this equation.
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